Though deep neural networks have achieved the state of the art performance in visual classification, recent studies have shown that they are all vulnerable to the attack of adversarial examples. In this paper, we develop improved techniques for defending against adversarial examples.First, we introduce enhanced defense using a technique we call Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP), a method that encourages both attention map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and their adversarial counterparts, AT+ALP improves accuracy on adversarial examples over adversarial training.Next,We show that our AT+ALP can effectively increase the average activations of adversarial examples in the key area and demonstrate that it focuse on more discriminate features to improve the robustness of the model.Finally,we conducte extensive experiments using a wide range of datasets and the experiment results show that our AT+ALP achieves the state of the art defense.For example,on 17 Flower Category Database, under strong 200-iteration PGD gray-box and black-box attacks where prior art has 34% and 39% accuracy, our method achieves 50% and 51%.Compared with previous work,our work is evaluated under highly challenging PGD attack:the maximum perturbation ∈ {0.25, 0.5} i.e. L∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} with 10 to 200 attack iterations.To our knowledge, such a strong attack has not been previously explored on a wide range of datasets.
Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks have been extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly visual classification problems, where new algorithms reported to achieve or even surpass the human performance (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012; He et al. 2015; Li et al. 2019a) .Success of deep neural networks has led to an explosion in demand. recent studies have shown that they are all vulnerable to the attack of adversarial examples. Small and often imperceptible perturbations to the input images are sufficient to fool the most powerful deep neural (a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) is original image and (b) is corresponding spatial attention map of ResNet-50 (He et al. 2015 ) pretrained on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015) which shows where the network focuses in order to classify the given image.(c) is adversarial image of (a) , (d) is corresponding spatial attention map.
networks (Szegedy et al. 2013; Carlini and Wagner 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Bose and Aarabi 2018) .
In Figure 1 , we visualize the spatial attention map of a flower and its corresponding adversarial image on ResNet-50 (He et al. 2015 ) pretrained on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015) . The figure suggests that adversarial perturbations, while small in the pixel space, lead to very substantial noise in the attention map of the network. Whereas the features for the clean image appear to focus primarily on semantically informative content in the image, the attention map for the adversarial image are activated across semantically irrelevant regions as well. The state of the art adversarial training methods only encourage soft (Madry et al. 2017; Tramèr et al. 2017) or hard labels,i.e.,logit(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) for pairs of clean examples and adversarial counterparts to be similar. In our opinion, it is not enough to align the difference between the clean examples and adversarial counterparts only at the end part of the whole network,i.e., hard or soft labels, and we need to align the attention maps for important parts of the whole network. Motivated by this observation,we explore Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP), a method that encourages both attention map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and their adversarial counterparts,AT+ALP improves accuracy on adversarial examples over adversarial training.
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The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We introduce enhanced adversarial training using a technique we call Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP), a method that encourages both attention map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and their adversarial counterparts, AT+ALP improves accuracy on adversarial examples over adversarial training.
• We show that our AT+ALP can effectively increase the average activations of adversarial examples in the key area and demonstrate that it focuse on more discriminate features to improve the robustness of the model. • We show that our AT+ALP achieves the state of the art defense on a wide range of datasets against strong PGD gray-box and black-box attacks.Compared with previous work,our work is evaluated under highly challenging PGD attack:the maximum perturbation ∈ {0.25, 0.5} i.e. L ∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} with 10 to 200 attack iterations.To our knowledge, such a strong attack has not been previously explored on a wide range of datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 related works are summarized, in Section 3 definitions and threat models are introduced,in Section 4 our Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP) method is introduced, in Section 5 experimental results are presented and discussed, and finally in Section 6 the paper is concluded.
Related Work (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) evaluate the robustness of nine papers (Buckman et al. 2018; Ma et al. 2018; Guo et al. 2017; Dhillon et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2017; Song et al. 2017; Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018; Madry et al. 2017; Na, Ko, and Mukhopadhyay 2017) accepted to ICLR 2018 as non-certified white-box-secure defenses to adversarial examples. They find that seven of the nine defenses use obfuscated gradients, a kind of gradient masking, as a phenomenon that leads to a false sense of security in defenses against adversarial examples.Obfuscated gradients provide a limited increase in robustness and can be broken by improved attack techniques they develop.The only defense they observe that significantly increases robustness to adversarial examples within the threat model proposed is adversarial training (Madry et al. 2017) .
Adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017; Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018; Tramèr et al. 2017; Pang et al. 2019 ) defends against adversarial perturbations by training networks on adversarial images that are generated on-the-fly during training. For adversarial training, the most relevant work to our study is (Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) ,which introduce a technique they call Adversarial Logit Pairing(ALP), a method that encourages logits for pairs of examples to be similar. Our AT+ALP encourages both attention map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and their adversarial counterparts, AT+ALP improves accuracy on adversarial examples over adversarial training. (Araujo et al. 2019) adds random noise at training and inference time, (Xie et al. 2018) adds denoising blocks to the model to increase adversarial robustness,neither of the above approaches focuses on the attention map.
In terms of methodologies, our work is also related to deep transfer learning and knowledge distillation problems,the most relevant work to our study is (Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016a; Li et al. 2019b) ,which constrain the L 2 -norm of the difference between their behaviors (i.e., the feature maps of outer layer outputs in the source/target networks).Our AT+ALP constrains attention map and logit for pairs of clean examples and their adversarial counterparts to be similar.
Definitions and Threat Models
In this paper, we always assume the attacker is capable of forming attacks that consist of perturbations of limited L ∞ -norm. This is a simplified task chosen because it is more amenable to benchmark evaluations. We consider two different threat models characterizing amounts of information the adversary can have:
• Gray-box Attack We focus on defense against graybox attacks in this paper. In a gray-back attack, the attacker knows both the original network and the defense algorithm. Only the parameters of the defense model are hidden from the attacker.This is also a standard setting assumed in many security systems and applications (Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2004 ).
• Black-box Attack The attacker has no information about the models architecture or parameters, and no ability to send queries to the model to gather more information.
Methods
Architecture Figure 2 represents architecture of Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP): a baseline model is adversarial trained so as, not only to make similar logits, but to also have similar spatial attention maps to those of original image and adversarial image.
Adversarial training
We use adversarial training with Projected Gradient Descent(PGD) (Madry et al. 2017) as the underlying basis for our methods:
wherep data is the underlying training data distribution, L(θ, x + δ, y) is a loss function at data point x which has true class y for a model with parameters θ, and the maximization with respect to δ is approximated using PGD. In this paper,the loss is defined as:
Where L CE is cross entropy,α and β are hyperparameters. 
Adversarial Logit Pairing
We also use Adversarial Logit Pairing(ALP) to encourage the logits from clean examples and their adversarial counterparts to be similar to each other. For a model that takes inputs x and computes a vector of logit z = f (x), logit pairing adds a loss:
In this paper we use L 2 loss for L a .
Attention Map
We use Attention Map(AT) to encourage the attention map from clean examples and their adversarial counterparts to be similar to each other.Let also I denote the indices of all activation layer pairs for which we want to pay attention. Then we can define the following total loss:
Let O, ADV denote clean examples and their adversarial counterparts.where
are respectively the j-th pair of clean examples and their adversarial counterparts attention maps in vectorized form, and p refers to norm type (in the experiments we use p = 2).
Experiments:Gray and Black-Box Settings
To evaluate the effectiveness of our defense strategy, we performed a series of image-classification experiments We consider untargeted attacks when evaluating under the gray and black-box settings ; untargeted attacks are also used in our adversarial training. We evaluate top-1 classification accuracy on validation images that are adversarially perturbed by the attacker. In this paper, adversarial perturbation is considered under L ∞ norm (i.e., maximum perturbation for each pixel), with an allowed maximum value of . The value of is relative to the pixel intensity scale of 256,we use = 64/256 = 0.25 and = 128/256 = 0.5. PGD attacker with 10 to 200 attack iterations and step size α = 1.0/256 = 0.0039. Our baselines are ResNet-101/152. There are four groups of convolutional structures in the baseline model,group-0 extracts of low-level features,group-1 and group-2 extract of mid-level features,group-3 extracts of high-level features(Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016b),which are described as conv2 x, conv3 x,conv4 x and conv5 x in (He et al. 2015) Image Database
We performed a series of image-classification experiments on a wide range of datasets.
• 17 Flower Category Database (Nilsback and Zisserman 2006) contains images of flowers belonging to 17 different categories.The images were acquired by searching the web and taking pictures. There are 80 images for each category. The maximum perturbation is ∈ {0.25, 0.5} i.e. L ∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5}.Our AT+ALP(purple line) outperform the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness against highly challenging gray-box and black-box PGD attacks.
• Part of ImageNet Database contains images of four objects. These four objects are randomly selected from the ImageNet Database (Russakovsky et al. 2015) . In this experiment, they are tench,goldfish,white shark and dog. Each object contains 1300 training images and 50 test images.
• Dogs-vs-Cats Database 1 contains 8,000 images of dogs and cats in the train dataset and 2,000 in the test val dataset.
Experimental Setup
To perform image classification, we use ResNet-101/152 that were trained on the 17 Flower Category Database,Part of ImageNet Database and Dogs-vs-Cats Database training set. We consider two different attack settings: (1) a gray-box attack setting in which the model used to generate the adversarial images is the same as 1 https://www.kaggle.com/chetankv/dogs-cats-images the image-classification model, viz. the ResNet-101; and (2) a black-box attack setting in which the adversarial images are generated using the ResNet-152 model;The backend prediction model of gray-box and black-box is ResNet-101 with different implementations of the state of the art defense methods,such as IGR (Ross and DoshiVelez 2017) , PAT(Madry et al. 2017) ,RAT (Araujo et al. 2019) ,Randomization (Xie et al. 2017) , ALP(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) and FD (Xie et al. 2018) .
Results and Discussion
Here, we first present results with AT+ALP on 17 Flower Category Database. Compared with previous work,(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) was evaluated under 10-iteration PGD attack and = 0.0625,our work are evaluated under highly challenging PGD attack:the maximum perturbation ∈ {0.25, 0.5} i.e. L ∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} with 10 to 200 attack iterations.The bigger the value of , the bigger the disturbance, the more significant the adversarial image Group-0 to group-3 represent the activation attention maps of four groups of convolutional structures in the baseline model,group-0 extracts of low-level features,group-1 and group-2 extract of mid-level features,group-3 extracts of high-level features (Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016b) . It can be clearly found that group-0 of AT + ALP can extract the outline and texture of flowers more accurately, and group-3 has a higher level of activation on the whole flower,compared with other defense methods, only it makes accurate prediction.
effect is.To our knowledge, such a strong attack has not been previously explored on a wide range of datasets.As shown in Figure 3 that our AT+ALP outperform the state-of-theart in adversarial robustness against highly challenging gray-box and black-box PGD attacks. For example, under strong 200-iteration PGD gray-box and black-box attacks where prior art has 34% and 39% accuracy, our method achieves 50% and 51%. Table 1 shows Main Result of our work:under strong 200-iteration PGD gray-box and black-box attacks,our AT+ALP outperform the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness on all these databases.
We visualized activation attention maps for defense against PGD attacks.Baseline model is ResNet-101 (He et al. 2015) ,which is pre-trained on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015) and fine-tuned on 17 Flower Category Database (Nilsback and Zisserman 2006) ,group-0 to group-3 represent the activation attention maps of four groups of convolutional structures in the baseline model i.e. conv2 x, conv3 x,conv4 x and conv5 x of ResNet-101 ,group-0 extracts of low-level features,group-1 and group-2 extract of mid-level features,group-3 extracts of high-level features (Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016b) .We found from Figure 4 that group-0 of AT + ALP can extract the outline and texture of flowers more accurately, and group-3 has a higher level of activation on the whole flower,compared with other defense methods, only AT + ALP makes accurate prediction. Table 2 , AT+ALP got the highest average activations on those key regions, demonstrating that AT+ALP focused on more discriminate features for flowers recognition. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced enhanced defense using a technique we called Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP), a method that encouraged both attention map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and their adversarial counterparts, AT+ALP improved accuracy on adversarial examples over adversarial training.Our AT+ALP achieves the state of the art defense on a wide range of datasets against PGD gray-box and black-box attacks.Compared with other defense methods, our AT+ALP is simple and effective, without modifying the model structure, and without adding additional image preprocessing steps.
